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ABSTRACT 
 
We estimate the effects on postsecondary education outcomes of the Kalamazoo Promise, a 
generous place-based college scholarship. We identify Promise effects using difference-in-
differences, comparing eligible to ineligible graduates before and after the Promise’s initiation. 
According to our estimates, the Promise significantly increases college enrollment, college 
credits attempted, and credential attainment. Stronger effects occur for minorities and women.  
Predicted lifetime earnings effects of the Promise’s credential gains, compared to the Promise’s 
scholarship costs, represent an internal rate of return of 11.3 percent. Based on our results, 
simple and generous scholarships can significantly increase educational attainment and provide 
net economic benefits. 
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 At a time of high returns to college but rising college costs, the Kalamazoo Promise 
provides simple and generous college financing. This program, often simply called the Promise, 
was announced on November 10, 2005, and offers large college tuition subsidies to graduates of 
Kalamazoo Public Schools (KPS). Funded by anonymous private donors, the Promise pays up to 
100 percent of tuition and fees for any public postsecondary institution in Michigan and is “first-
dollar,” so aid is not reduced by other scholarships. The only conditions to qualify for the 
Promise are that a student be continuously enrolled in KPS since at least ninth grade, that he or 
she live in the school district and graduate from KPS, and that he or she gets into any public 
college in the state. 
The Kalamazoo Promise, being the first such “place-based” scholarship, has generated 
much interest in the media and from other school districts.1 Since 2005, more than 30 
communities around the country have adopted Promise-style programs, in some cases using 
public funding or imposing additional requirements for eligibility. While there is a large 
literature on the effects of financial aid—including state merit-based scholarship programs—on 
postsecondary education outcomes, little is known about the effectiveness of place-based 
scholarships, which tend to be far more generous and open to a broader swath of students. With 
place-based scholarships becoming more common and state appropriations to public colleges 
having declined over the past 15 years (Baum and Ma 2014), understanding the potential for 
alternative approaches to help finance postsecondary education will only grow in importance.  
In this paper, we estimate the effects of the Kalamazoo Promise on postsecondary 
education outcomes, including attendance, persistence, and degree completion. To identify 
Promise effects, we estimate difference-in-differences models that compare outcomes of eligible 
1 See, for example, Bartik and Lachowska (2014); Burke (2014); Caplan-Bricker (2014); CBS News 
(2007); Economist (2008); Fishman (2012); and NBC News (2013). 
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 students to those of ineligible students both before and after the announcement of the Promise, 
conditional on available student characteristics. As the Promise’s tuition subsidy varies with the 
length of continuous enrollment in the school district, we exploit a large change in generosity in 
which the scholarship pays at least 65 percent of tuition and fees for students enrolled by the 
beginning of ninth grade but zero for students enrolled afterward. The unexpected announcement 
of the Promise in the fall of 2005 created a situation in which some KPS students found 
themselves eligible for at least 65 percent of future tuition subsides, while others discovered they 
were ineligible for the scholarship. This situation thus resembles a natural experiment in which 
one group of students is entitled to tuition subsidies and another group is not entitled to anything. 
Our core identifying assumption is that trends in unobservables did not change between Promise-
eligible and -ineligible students around the time of the Promise announcement, and we explore 
the sensitivity of this assumption in several robustness checks. 
We examine both shorter-term outcomes, such as enrollment, as well as medium- and 
longer-term outcomes, such as credits attempted and credentials earned. We find substantively 
large and statistically significant effects of the Promise on many postsecondary outcomes, 
including the following three: 1) the probability of any college enrollment as well enrollment at a 
four-year college, 2) the cumulative number of credits attempted within two to four years after 
high school graduation, and 3) the probability of obtaining any postsecondary credential as well 
as the probability specifically of obtaining a bachelor’s degree.  
Due to the Promise, we estimate that the chance of students enrolling in any college 
within six months of high school graduation increases by 14 percent, and the chance of students 
enrolling in a four-year college is estimated to increase by 34 percent. Based on our estimated 
Promise effects, the cumulative number of credits attempted increases by 15 percent as of two 
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 years after high school graduation, and these effects persist. At two years out, the effects imply 
an additional class attempted; at four years out, they imply an additional two to three classes 
attempted. As of six years after high school graduation, the Promise increases the percentage of 
students earning any postsecondary credential by 12 percentage points, from a pre-Promise 
baseline of 36 percent to 48 percent; this represents a proportional increase in credential 
attainment of one-third. About four-fifths of this boost in postsecondary credentials is due to 
more students earning a bachelor’s degree. The credential attainment effects imply a large 
internal rate of return in increased earnings—over 11 percent—relative to the costs of the 
Promise’s tuition subsidy. 
These Promise effects are not driven by more advantaged students. The college 
completion results (as well as enrollment and credits-attempted results) are statistically 
indistinguishable and quantitatively similar for students regardless of whether they qualified for a 
lunch subsidy, our proxy for family income. Promise effects are at least as great and often greater 
for nonwhite students than for white students.   
Importantly, these Promise estimates are conservative in two ways. First, by comparing 
Promise-eligible versus -ineligible students, these estimates omit possible community-wide or 
school-wide spillover effects of the Promise. The Kalamazoo community and KPS have used the 
Promise to encourage a more college-going culture among parents and students, and have added 
services to increase the likelihood of college success. Any community or district changes might 
also affect Promise-ineligible students. In addition, Promise-ineligible students may benefit from 
positive peer effects from Promise-eligible students.  
Second, our estimates are restricted to students who are high school graduates. This 
restriction occurs because we link KPS individual student records with National Student 
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 Clearinghouse data on these same students’ postsecondary experiences. We can link such data 
only for KPS graduates, for whom such records have been requested by KPS. Because we 
condition on students graduating from KPS, our estimates omit any Promise effects on 
graduating from high school. Our estimates of postsecondary success might be attenuated if the 
Promise results in more marginal students being included among KPS graduates.  
In the next section of this paper, we discuss how the current study fits into the large 
literature on merit scholarships and the smaller literature on place-based scholarships. In the third 
section, we describe the institutional details of the Kalamazoo Promise. We follow by outlining 
our data and methodology and then present our results. We also evaluate the strength of our 
identification assumptions through several robustness checks and examine heterogeneity of 
Promise effects across different student groups. We conclude by discussing implications of our 
results for policy. 
THIS STUDY IN CONTEXT 
Our analysis is related to the voluminous literature on the effects of college tuition 
subsidies on postsecondary outcomes. Deming and Dynarski (2010) provide an excellent review, 
and for brevity’s sake we only skim the surface here.  
Most prior research has focused on merit scholarships, as they are more common and 
thus offer more plentiful identifying variation. These sorts of scholarships typically require a 
minimum high school GPA, a minimum college entrance examination score (the SAT or ACT), 
or both. Georgia HOPE is one of the most-studied merit aid programs. Dynarski (2002, 2004) 
and Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar (2006) have found that Georgia HOPE increased college 
enrollment and also shifted college choices toward HOPE-eligible Georgia colleges. Researchers 
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 have found that other merit aid programs, such as the D.C. Tuition Assistance Grant (Abraham 
and Clark 2006, Kane 2006) and California’s Cal Grant program (Kane 2003), also increased 
college enrollment, generally in the vicinity of 3 to 5 percentage points per $1,000 of annual aid 
among affected students. However, effects on outcomes beyond net enrollment have been mixed. 
For example, unlike Georgia HOPE, the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship did not shift 
student interest toward Tennessee colleges, but did lead to better performance on the ACT 
college exam (Pallais 2007). Scott-Clayton (2011) finds that the West Virginia Promise (despite 
its name, a merit program) increased the probability of completing a bachelor’s degree within 
four years. However, Sjoquist and Winters (2012) find that state-based merit aid programs, as a 
whole, have generally not been successful in increasing college attainment. Nonetheless, Deming 
and Dynarski (2010) conclude that several merit-based programs have large enough effects to 
pass a social benefit-cost test: the increase in the present value of future earnings of affected 
students exceeds the scholarship’s costs. 
Less research has investigated broad-based scholarships with minimal academic 
requirements like the Kalamazoo Promise. As Dynarski (2004) points out, however, some state 
merit scholarships have modest requirements, and this makes research on merit scholarships 
pertinent to this paper. Furthermore, an important and relevant exception is Dynarski’s (2003) 
study on Social Security student benefits, which existed between 1965 and 1982. She finds that 
when Social Security ended this benefit, which had been available to most students with a 
deceased parent, the probability of attending college and educational attainment fell for affected 
students. While these results suggest scholarships without merit requirements can have important 
effects on completed education, the population studied faced a rather different landscape of 
educational options and college costs than is in existence today. 
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 The study of place-based scholarships, in contrast, has not yet reached early adolescence. 
Much of the existing research on place-based scholarships has focused on community or school 
district outcomes, such as housing prices and K–12 enrollment. In large part, this is because 
these types of scholarships are relatively new and these outcomes can be observed sooner. It also 
reflects the scholarships taking place on a sub–state scale and being designed to reinvigorate the 
local community in addition to promoting higher education. Indeed, Bartik, Eberts, and Huang 
(2010) and Hershbein (2013) show that the declining enrollment in KPS abruptly reversed 
following the introduction of the Kalamazoo Promise, and that enrollment changes were 
concentrated in grades eligible to receive the scholarship. Although Miller (forthcoming) finds 
the Promise had little effect on housing prices, the contemporaneous timing of the burst of the 
housing bubble complicates inference. LeGower and Walsh (2014) study nearly two dozen 
place-based scholarships (including Kalamazoo’s) in a panel setting and find positive effects on 
school district enrollment and housing prices, with generally larger effects for more-generous 
and less-restrictive programs. 
While we might expect a place-based scholarship to attract families into a school district, 
a skeptic might argue that such a scholarship, with minimal academic requirements, will fail to 
encourage postsecondary success. The emerging evidence suggests, however, that the 
Kalamazoo Promise has improved high school outcomes and shaped postsecondary school 
choices. Andrews, DesJardins, and Ranchhod’s (2010) study examines the effects of the 
Kalamazoo Promise on college choice. The authors examine where ACT scores are sent by KPS 
students before and after the Promise, compared with trends for other Michigan public school 
students. They find that the Promise increased score-sending to baccalaureate-granting colleges 
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 in Michigan, especially the University of Michigan and Michigan State University, and that these 
effects were concentrated among test-takers from lower-income families.  
In a paper using a similar identification strategy to the present study, Bartik and 
Lachowska (2013) compare high school achievement and behavior of Promise-eligible students 
versus ineligible students before and after the Promise announcement. They find that the Promise 
reduced disciplinary incidents, and, for African American students, increased GPAs. If the 
Promise alters students’ high school success, this effect might carry over to college outcomes. 
BACKGROUND ON KPS AND THE PROMISE 
Kalamazoo Public Schools 
Kalamazoo Public Schools (KPS) is a midsized, mostly urban school district in 
southwestern Michigan. Like many urban school districts, KPS is both poorer and more 
ethnically diverse than surrounding areas. In the year before the Promise’s announcement, the 
district’s poverty rate for school-aged youth was 28 percent, and African Americans and 
Hispanics made up 47 percent and 8 percent of district enrollment. For other school districts in 
the county, the poverty rate was only 8 percent, and African Americans and Hispanics were just 
5 percent and 2 percent of enrollment.2 
Figure 1 shows that prior to the Promise, enrollment in KPS had been declining. The 
Promise announcement in the fall of 2005 reversed that trend, and KPS enrollment has 
rebounded sharply. Bartik, Eberts, and Huang (2010) show that most of the subsequent increase 
stems from a reduced student exit rate after the Promise. 
2 Poverty rates are from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, and 
enrollment by ethnicity is from Michigan’s Center for Educational Performance and Information.  
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 Table 1 shows the number of KPS graduates from 2003 through 2013. Graduates are 
divided into two groups: 1) those who are Promise-eligible (or would have been eligible if the 
Promise had existed in the past) and 2) those who are ineligible for the Promise because they 
entered the district too late to be Promise-eligible. 
The Kalamazoo Promise 
Announced in November 2005 and taking effect for the high school class of 2006, the 
Kalamazoo Promise is a scholarship available to all students who graduate from KPS, reside in 
the district, and have been continuously enrolled since the beginning of high school.3 Unlike 
most student aid, the Promise has neither merit requirements (high school GPA or test scores) 
nor financial need requirements. According to the donors who anonymously fund the 
scholarship, the Promise’s purpose is to enhance Kalamazoo’s economic development (Miller-
Adams 2009), in part by attracting parents and businesses to the region as well as increasing the 
local supply and retention of college graduates.  
Applying for the Promise is quick and simple compared to most other forms of student 
financial aid, especially the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (the FAFSA). In their 
senior year of high school, students fill out a one-page form asking basic contact information and 
only a half-dozen substantive—but straightforward—questions (see Figure 2). Bettinger et al. 
(2012) find that providing assistance in filling out complicated financial aid forms or simplifying 
the process can increase aid receipt and improve college outcomes. The simplicity of the Promise 
application has contributed to its high use rate of more than 85 percent.4  
3 More precisely, the requirement is being enrolled as of the fall count day in ninth grade.  
4 This use rate is the share of eligible students who successfully submit forms, enroll at a Promise-eligible 
institution, and receive a Promise scholarship for at least one credit hour. Nearly all students—eligible or not—
submit applications. For comparison, in 2012, the estimated Kalamazoo County completion rate for the FAFSA was 
only 63 percent. http://www.thelearningnetwork.org/Scorecard/CollegeCareerReadiness/tabid/370/Default.aspx 
(accessed June 22, 2015). 
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 The Promise pays up to 100 percent of tuition and fees at any public community college 
or university in Michigan.5 The award is treated as first-dollar, meaning that it is applied before 
grant money from other sources.6 The Promise benefit is graduated based on the length of 
continuous enrollment in the district’s schools: the 100 percent subsidy is for students who have 
been in KPS since kindergarten; the rate is 95 percent for students enrolled since first through 
third grade; the rate is decreased by five percentage points for each subsequent grade through 
ninth (at a 65 percent scholarship), and no scholarship is available for students whose last 
continuous spell in KPS begins after the start of ninth grade. 
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the grade first (and continuously) enrolled in 
KPS and the Promise’s generosity. The figure shows the large drop in expected generosity 
between enrolling before and after ninth grade. As discussed in our data and methods section, 
our identification strategy exploits this sizable change in generosity.  
Eligible students have 10 years from high school graduation to use the scholarship. The 
Promise pays for up to 130 credits, just above the number typically needed for a bachelor’s 
degree. Students must be enrolled full-time (12 or more credit hours per semester), with the 
exception of Kalamazoo Valley Community College (KVCC), the local two-year college, where 
the required enrollment intensity is only half-time.7 To maintain eligibility, enrolled students 
must keep a GPA of at least 2.0 per enrollment period. Students falling below this threshold can 
5 Beginning with the high school class of 2015, KPS graduates can also use the Promise at 15 Michigan 
private colleges. For these colleges, the Promise will pay up to the tuition and fees of the University of Michigan, 
the most expensive public college; the private colleges themselves will pay the remaining tuition costs (Mack 2014).  
6 Although students do not need to apply for other scholarships to receive the Promise, Promise-eligible 
students are encouraged to fill out the FAFSA, as federal aid (e.g., Pell grants) can be used for college expenses such 
as room and board, books, and supplies that the Promise does not cover. In fact, FAFSA completion rates are higher 
in KPS than in other school districts in the county, despite the socioeconomic differences mentioned above, 
suggesting that the Promise does not crowd out federal aid. 
7 This exception was instituted for enrollment periods beginning in the fall of 2007. 
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 regain eligibility by attending college for a semester without Promise support and raising their 
GPA above the cutoff. 
Through the end of 2014, total scholarships paid by the Kalamazoo Promise reached $61 
million, with an apparently steady spending level of $10–11 million per year being reached by 
2011. As of the fall of 2014, approximately 1,400 KPS graduates were using the Promise, which 
amounts to average spending per recipient of about $4,000 per semester. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data 
Our data come from KPS and Promise administrative records merged with National 
Student Clearinghouse (NSC) data on college attendance. Our data span high school graduates 
from the classes of 2003 through 2013. From KPS, we obtain information on student 
characteristics: sex, race/ethnicity, participation in the federal assisted lunch program, and high 
school of graduation. The KPS records are more extensively discussed in Appendix A, titled 
“Data.”  
Most importantly for our identification strategy, the KPS records provide a history of 
student enrollment in the district, which allows us to construct a Promise eligibility indicator (see 
Appendix A). Our sample includes three pre-Promise cohorts (the graduating classes of 2003 
through 2005) and up to eight post-Promise cohorts (the classes of 2006 through 2013). The 
enrollment data go back to 1997, which allows us to track enrollment histories for all our cohorts 
back to sixth grade. Hence, the data allow us to distinguish KPS graduates eligible for any tuition 
subsidies—that is, a subsidy of at least 65 percent, from continuous enrollment prior to the start 
of ninth grade—from KPS graduates who are ineligible for any subsidies. However, for the 
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 earlier cohorts, we cannot identify the exact fractional scholarship (above 65 percent) for which 
earlier cohorts would have been eligible had the Promise existed.8 We are skeptical, however, 
that many students and their families would be overly sensitive to marginal changes in the 
percentage of tuition subsidized relative to the very large change from 0 to 65 percent. Thus, we 
discretize the Promise eligibility variable to be binary: any Promise eligibility versus no Promise 
eligibility. 
In the pre-Promise period, we define a dummy that equals one if the student would have 
been eligible for any tuition subsidy from the Promise had the Promise been in effect, and zero if 
the student would have been ineligible. In the post-Promise period, we use administrative data 
from the Promise on eligibility.9 Because these dummies indicate Promise eligibility rather than 
receipt, our estimates show intent-to-treat effects of the Promise, not treatment effects of actually 
receiving the scholarship.  
The KPS high-school-level data are joined to NSC data using a student-level identifier.10 
The NSC provides for each KPS graduate the specific colleges attended, the dates and intensity 
of attendance, and degrees or credentials earned. These data allow us to investigate the patterns 
of initial attendance, persistence and transfer behavior, and completions.11  
8 Specifically, students with 80 percent or greater scholarships must be grouped together, as data do not go 
back far enough to precisely assign a scholarship percentage for the 2003 graduates. 
9 For the post-Promise period, our calculations of Promise eligibility closely match Promise records. We 
use Promise records to minimize measurement error. Estimates using calculated eligibility for all students are not 
substantively different from the estimates presented in this paper.  
10 Details of this matching procedure are found in Appendix A.  
11 As documented by Dynarski, Hemelt, and Hyman (2013), NSC coverage is high but not exhaustive. For 
this study, the main issue is that the local two-year college, Kalamazoo Valley Community College (KVCC), has 
NSC records only since the fall of 2005. To avoid excluding earlier KVCC students, we obtained from KVCC 
enrollment data from the summer of 2003 forward to the summer of 2005 for KPS students who graduated between 
2003 and 2005. 
11 
                                                 
 Table 2A presents means for student characteristics and outcome variables, as determined 
by whether the student is observed in the pre-Promise or post-Promise period and whether the 
student is eligible or not for the Promise tuition subsidies.  
Methodology 
Our methodological approach is a difference-in-differences analysis, comparing the 
outcomes of Promise-eligible students to ineligible students, before and after the Promise. This is 
summarized by the following regression model: 
(1)   yit = α + δ1Eligit + δ2Post-Promiseit + δ3(Post-Promise × Elig)it + γt + xitβ + uit ,  
where i denotes the individual student and t denotes the academic year in which we observe the 
student. The outcome variable of interest is y; “Elig” equals one if, based on length of enrollment 
in KPS, the student is (would have been) eligible for a Promise tuition subsidy and zero 
otherwise; “Post-Promise” equals one if the student graduated after the Promise was in effect—
the class of 2006 and later—and zero if before; and “Post-Promise × Elig” is an interaction 
between the two dummies. We also include a set of year dummies, γt. The variable x is a vector 
of student-level observables, and u denotes student i’s unobservable traits. The coefficient of 
greatest interest is δ3. This coefficient is a conservative estimate of Promise effects: differential 
outcomes for Promise-eligible students, compared both to ineligible students’ outcomes and to 
pre-Promise outcomes. 
The validity of a difference-in-differences strategy rests on two assumptions. The first 
assumption is that there is a common time trend in conditional outcomes between eligible and 
ineligible students before the Promise. In a hypothetical world without the Promise, outcomes of 
eligible and ineligible students would have followed a common, parallel trend, conditional on 
12 
 observables. The second assumption is that no other change in KPS besides the Promise affected 
eligible and ineligible students’ outcomes in a differential way. 
If these two assumptions hold, then in an imaginary auxiliary regression of the disturbance 
term u on the right-hand-side variables, the coefficient on the “Post-Promise × Elig” interaction 
term would be zero. Unobservables would be uncorrelated with the interaction term after 
controlling for the x variables and the separate “Elig” and “Post-Promise” dummies. In this case, 
the coefficient δ3 will consistently estimate the effect of Promise eligibility on outcome y.  
These identification assumptions are threatened if there is differential trending in student 
outcomes due to compositional changes over time in the relatively small subset of graduates who 
entered KPS after ninth grade and are thus ineligible for the Promise. If the group of ineligible 
students is systematically different before and after the Promise, estimated effects of the Promise 
would be confounded with effects due to changing group composition.  
We deal with changing group composition in part by directly including controls for 
observable x variables, such as sex, race and ethnicity, participation in the federal subsidized 
lunch program, and high school of graduation. In addition to including these controls directly, we 
use them to construct inverse propensity score weights (IPW) that make post-Promise graduates 
resemble pre-Promise graduates in the joint distribution of observables (DiNardo, Fortin, and 
Lemieux 1996). By including these weights as well as the covariates directly, we implement 
what is sometimes called the augmented IPW (AIPW) estimator.12  
To implement the reweighting, we first estimate via logit the propensity score, p(x) = 
Pr(Pre-Promise = 1|x), where “Pre-Promise” equals one if the student graduated before the 
12 In practice, our estimates are virtually identical if we use just the IPWs without the relevant covariates. 
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 Promise, and is zero otherwise.13 We assign a weight, 𝑤(𝑥) = 𝑝�(𝑥)
1−𝑝�(𝑥) , if pre-Promise = 0, and 
𝑤(𝑥) = 1 if pre-Promise = 1. We use the propensity score to reweight the students in the post-
Promise period so that the distribution of covariates x of students in the post-Promise period 
resembles that of students in the pre-Promise period. We perform this reweighting procedure 
separately for eligible and ineligible students. These w(x) weights are then used to run weighted 
least squares difference-in-differences regressions. Table 2B shows how the distribution of 
covariates changes in the post-Promise period because of these weights.14 The reweighting 
eliminates all significant differences in covariates between the pre-Promise and post-Promise 
periods.  
It is still possible, however, that selection on unobservables remains, particularly later in 
the posttreatment period. After presenting the results, we will further examine threats to 
identification by looking at year-by-year trends in effects of Promise eligibility. We will also 
examine the effects of restricting the sample to exclude all students who entered KPS after the 
Promise announcement.  
RESULTS FOR POSTSECONDARY OUTCOMES 
We consider Promise effects on postsecondary outcomes in the short term, medium term, 
and long term.  
13Our propensity score reweighting fully saturates the logit model with the various discrete variables 
controlling for gender, race, and free or reduced-price lunch status. In contrast, the control–variable approach 
includes each discrete variable without the interaction terms, as in previous studies.  
14 We have confirmed that there is common support among the discrete demographic cells used for 
reweighting, with the exception of a handful of observations that are omitted from the reweighted regressions. A 
histogram of the propensity scores is available upon request. 
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 Short-Term Outcomes 
Table 3 presents results for enrollment outcomes. The four panels examine enrollment at 
any postsecondary institution, or at a four-year school, within either 6 months or 12 months of 
high school graduation. For each outcome, the left column reports results for the specification 
with demographic controls, and the right column reports results for the specification with 
demographic controls and IPW reweighting. The table reports estimated coefficients on the 
interaction between Promise eligibility and graduation after the Promise, δ3, which we interpret 
as the effects of the Promise tuition subsidies. 
The advantage of looking at short-term outcomes is that they can be measured for more 
cohorts. Because our postsecondary data run through the 2013–2014 school year, we observe 
seven post-Promise graduating classes, 2006 through 2013, as well as three pre-Promise 
graduating classes, 2003 through 2005.  
For enrollment at any postsecondary institution within six months of high school 
graduation, the estimated Promise effect is a net enrollment increase of about 8 percentage 
points. The estimates are substantively quite similar regardless of whether IPW reweighting is 
used, although statistical significance weakens very slightly under reweighting. The percentage-
point increase is large relative to the mean enrollment probability of 0.602 among eligibles in the 
pre-Promise period, representing an increase of 14 percent (0.084/0.602). However, when the 
enrollment horizon is extended to 12 months, the enrollment effects are smaller and not 
statistically significant. This finding suggests that the Promise may operate in part by 
accelerating the time to first enrollment. 
Enrollment effects of the Promise are greater at four-year colleges. At either a 6-month or 
12-month horizon, our estimates suggest that the Promise increases four-year college enrollment 
by 9 to 13 percentage points. These greater four-year enrollment effects compared to overall 
15 
 enrollment effects suggest two conclusions: that Promise-induced enrollment is driven by the 
four-year sector on net, and that the Promise may induce substitution from the two-year to the 
four-year sector.15 Because the base enrollment at four-year colleges is lower, the implied 
percentage effect is 23 to 34 percent (0.095/0.405 to 0.133/0.397). The similarity of the 
enrollment horizon results for four-year colleges suggests that the all-college enrollment horizon 
differences in enrollment timing are concentrated in the two-year sector, which is plausible.16  
Previous research shows that aid can affect not just whether a student attends college, but 
which college she attends.17 We explore this margin of response in Table 4, which shows 
estimates of college attendance at Promise-eligible and Promise-ineligible schools. The first 
panel shows that attendance at a Promise-eligible institution—public two-year and four-year 
colleges in Michigan—increases by a huge amount: 18 percentage points. This represents an 
increase over the pre-Promise base of almost 40 percent (0.178/0.472 = 38 percent; 0.184/0.472 
= 39 percent), which echoes Andrews, DesJardins, and Ranchhod’s (2010) findings on ACT 
score-sending. We obtain similar point estimates when looking at Michigan four-year publics 
(Panel B), but because the pre-Promise base attendance at Michigan four-year schools is lower, 
the proportional effect on Michigan four-year attendance is over 60 percent (0.175/0.277 base = 
63 percent; 0.207/0.277 = 75 percent).  
The third panel shows that the gains at Promise-eligible schools are partially due to losses 
at ineligible institutions. Such attendance declined by 10 percentage points, or almost 80 percent. 
15 These conclusions are only suggestive because the four-year enrollment effects are not statistically 
different from the all-college effects. If we examine the effects at two-year colleges directly, we find a small, 
negative point estimate not statistically different from zero, in line with the difference in the estimates between the 
all-college effects and the four-year college effects. The small point estimate for two-years likely masks offsetting 
effects, as some students upgrade to 4-years and others are induced to attend college at the extensive margin. 
16 In our data, about 97 percent of students who enroll in a four-year college within 12 months of high 
school graduation do so within the first 6 months. Only 80 percent of students who enroll in a two-year college 
within 12 months of high school graduation do so within the first 6 months. 
17 An especially salient example of how aid affects college choice is provided by Cohodes and Goodman 
(2014) and the references therein. 
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 Reassuringly, the sum of the estimates in Panels B and C accord quite closely with the net 
attendance results from Table 3. While not shown in Table 4, the drop in attendance at 
noneligible schools is driven by out-of-state schools, not private schools in Michigan. This 
substitution effect is consistent with the Promise donors’ desire to encourage Michigan college 
attendance.18  
Medium-Term Outcomes 
These positive enrollment effects align with previous studies, but do these effects persist? 
Table 5 explores medium-term effects: the number of credits attempted over different horizons 
after high school graduation. 
Although the NSC data do not track credits explicitly, they report intensity of enrollment: 
full-time, half-time, and less than half-time.19 We convert terms to a semester equivalent and 
assign values of 12 credits for full-time students, 6 credits for half-time students, and 3 credits 
for less than half-time students; these credits are summed over various time horizons since high 
school graduation, and students who never enroll are assigned zeros. We expect this credits-
attempted variable to be highly positively correlated with credits actually earned and with 
eventual degree attainment. 
Compared to enrollment outcomes in Tables 3 and 4, the credits-attempted variables have 
fewer observations. The enrollment outcomes have data through the class of 2013, whereas the 
credits attempted at two years, three years, and four years after high school have data only 
through the classes of 2012, 2011, and 2010, respectively. Analysis of longer-term outcomes 
thus comes at the cost of fewer cohorts and less statistical precision. 
18The large increases at eligible Michigan four-year institutions are driven by Western Michigan 
University, local to Kalamazoo, and Michigan State University, about 80 miles away. 
19 NSC also reports whether the student withdrew before the end of term, which we interpret as 0 credits. 
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 The first panel of Table 5 shows that, as of two years after high school graduation, the 
Promise increased cumulative credits attempted by just over three credits, or about one class. In 
proportional terms, this increase is between 13 percent and 15 percent above the pre-Promise 
baseline.  
The latter two panels of the table indicate that the boost to credits attempted persists over 
longer horizons, and, despite the smaller samples, increases in statistical significance. As of three 
years after high school, the Promise has led students to enroll in 4.6 to 5.7 additional credits 
(between 13 percent and 16 percent above baseline). As of four years after high school, the effect 
on credits attempted ranges from 6.9 to 9.3 (15 to 20 percent), depending on whether IPWs are 
used. Put differently, after the equivalent of eight semesters, treated students took an additional 
two to three classes, which is a sizable gain. 
It is worth emphasizing that these results capture the extensive margin and not just the 
intensive margin. A natural question is whether credits attempted also increase among students 
who enroll in college. Although these results are not shown in the table, we have investigated the 
Promise’s effect on credits attempted for both students who enroll in any college within 12 
months of high school graduation and those who specifically enroll in four-year colleges. These 
estimates are not causal, certainly, given the enrollment results in Table 3, but we view them as 
interesting and descriptive. In particular, we find that among KPS graduates who enroll at all, the 
Promise has essentially no effect on the number of credits attempted. This would seem to suggest 
that the results in Table 5 are driven by the extensive margin, but this is not quite the case. If we 
look at those who enroll specifically at four-year colleges, Promise-eligible students do increase 
the number of credits they attempt, generally by 10–12 percent. The Promise, then, does not just 
boost credits attempted by increasing college enrollment at the extensive margin; rather, some 
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 students (those who enroll at four-year colleges) actually appear to take more classes, while other 
students (those who enroll at two-year colleges) appear to take fewer classes.20 
Longer-Term Outcomes 
We now turn to Promise effects on educational attainment or degree completion (Table 
6). Degree completion is arguably the most important outcome, whether for researchers or 
policymakers. This outcome is also one over which the literature is most divided on the effects of 
financial aid, with some studies finding positive impacts and others none. 
Our degree attainment estimates focus on two outcomes at two time horizons. The 
outcomes are 1) receipt of any credential, including a certificate, an associate’s degree, or a 
bachelor’s degree, and 2) receipt specifically of a bachelor’s degree. The time horizons are four 
years and six years after high school graduation.  
For the four-year time horizon, we have follow-up data for five post-Promise cohorts, 
through the class of 2010. For the six-year time horizon, we have data for only three post-
Promise cohorts, through the class of 2008. The reduction in post-Promise cohorts reduces the 
precision of our estimates.  
For the four-year horizon, for either any credential (Panel A) or bachelor’s degree (Panel 
C), point estimates are close to zero. Standard errors are large enough that positive or negative 
effects of 5 percentage points (relative to a baseline of 14 to 18 percent) cannot be ruled out. But 
given that the median duration to a bachelor’s degree is well over four years (Bound, 
Lovenheim, and Turner 2010; Cataldi et al. 2011), and that full funding from the Promise is 
20 This is consistent, for example, with the marginal students induced by the Promise to attend a two-year 
college, who otherwise would not have enrolled at all, disproportionately enrolling part-time. (Recall that the 
Promise allows part-time enrollment at Kalamazoo Valley Community College.) 
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 available by taking the equivalent of just 12 credits per semester, or a five-year pace for a 
bachelor’s degree, four years may be too short a time horizon over which to expect an impact. 
Over a six-year horizon, point estimates are positive and large. The Promise effect on 
attainment of any credential as of six years is between 9 and 12 percentage points. The 
confidence intervals imply a wider range of possible effects. On the high side, we cannot rule out 
a 20-percentage-point increase. On the low side, the 9-percentage-point effect is statistically 
different from zero at a 6 percent significance level, and the 12-percentage-point effect is 
significantly different from zero at a 2 percent significance level. Still, these point estimates 
would be judged by most researchers and policymakers to be large. Relative to a pre-Promise 
mean credential attainment of 36 percent among eligibles, the estimates represent an increase in 
credential attainment of 25–34 percent (0.091 or 0.123 divided by 0.357).  
For the attainment of a bachelor’s degree (Panel D), we again find sizable point 
estimates, although statistical significance is slightly weaker. The 7–10 percentage-point increase 
translates to a percentage boost between 23 and 33 percent in the likelihood of earning a 
bachelor’s degree (0.067 or 0.097 divided by 0.296). The bachelor’s degree results suggest that 
most of the Promise effect on degree attainment comes from increasing bachelor’s attainment.21 
ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES 
In this section we examine the internal validity of our empirical approach and results 
through several tests of our identification strategy. Finding that our results are quite robust, we 
also explore heterogeneous impacts of the Promise on different types of students, particularly 
with regard to students’ socioeconomic status and ethnicity.  
21 One could speculate that the Promise induces some students to get bachelor’s degrees who otherwise 
would get associate’s degrees, which reduces the net effects on non–bachelor’s degrees.  
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 Threats to Identification 
Our identifying assumption is that the Promise-eligible groups and Promise-ineligible 
groups do not have trends in unobservable variables that cause a divergence in postsecondary 
outcomes. As discussed earlier, there are two possible threats to this identification. First, there is 
the possibility of differential pretrending: i.e., that outcomes between the two groups were 
diverging even before the Promise. Second, the Promise may have induced changes in the 
composition of the two groups—perhaps due to selective migration (Hershbein 2013)—that led 
to relatively more favorable outcomes for Promise-eligible students vis-à-vis ineligible students. 
One approach to addressing these identification threats is to examine the differences 
(conditional on covariates) in postsecondary outcomes for the two groups separately for each 
year. This strategy allows for an investigation of common pretrending before the Promise as well 
as the timing of the Promise “effect” in subsequent years. If our identification assumption is 
valid, we should expect to see an abrupt increase in the outcome among eligibles in the first year 
of the program, with no clear change among ineligibles. Of course, there is also the possibility of 
a trending effect that is still consistent with true effects of the Promise. For example, over time, 
Promise-eligible students may become better prepared academically to use the Promise (Bartik 
and Lachowska 2013). 
Therefore, in Figure 4 we present fitted probabilities of enrollment in a four-year school 
within six months of high school graduation (Table 3, Panel C, column 1), allowing full 
interactions between class year and eligibility status. If these fitted probabilities were diverging 
by eligibility in the pre-Promise period, we might be concerned that the Table 3 results were 
spurious. This is not the case: the fitted probabilities evolve similarly between the classes of 
2003 and 2005. Reassuringly, there is a sharp spike in attendance among eligibles that begins for 
the class of 2006 and that remains elevated over the remaining horizon, perhaps even increasing 
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 slightly over time. The time path for ineligibles is noisy, owing to smaller sample sizes, but there 
is no sustained increase, and the probabilities oscillate from year to year. These patterns support 
our identifying assumptions. 
Figures 5 and 6 similarly present results allowing for the full interaction of Promise 
eligibility and cohort for the predicted number of credits attempted within two years of high 
school graduation (Figure 5) and for the fitted probability of attaining a bachelor’s degree within 
six years of high school graduation. The patterns are in accord with Figure 4: there is a jump for 
eligibles for the 2006 cohort, with the level remaining elevated over the rest of the cohort 
horizon; the levels for ineligibles fluctuate from year to year with no sustained increase. 
A second approach to dealing with threats to identification, particularly dynamic 
selection effects, is to check whether the estimates are robust to excluding new entrants to KPS 
after the Promise. This strategy necessarily excludes an increasing number of students from the 
sample over time, particularly from the ineligible group, who are by definition later entrants near 
the end of the sample horizon. Therefore, the reduction in the possibility of selection bias by 
restricting the sample to students who were in KPS prior to the Promise’s announcement comes 
at the expense of estimate precision. 
We have redone selected estimates using this smaller sample that includes only students 
who had entered KPS before the Promise was announced. The selected estimates were for the 
six-month enrollment outcome, the six-month enrollment in four-year college outcome, the six-
year all-credential attainment estimates, and the six-year bachelor of arts/bachelor of science 
(BA/BS) credential attainment. In most cases, the resulting point estimates from excluding late-
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 entrant students are not close to being substantively or statistically different from the estimates in 
Tables 4 and 6 that include the late-entrant students.22  
The one exception is for enrollment at a four-year college at six months after high school 
graduation. Without new entrants, the point estimate shrinks, and the difference in estimates is 
statistically significant at a 7 percent level. 
This finding has at least three alternative interpretations. The first interpretation is that 
dropping new entrants reduces selection bias, and therefore we should view these estimates as 
more reliable, which suggests lower effects of the Promise on attendance at four-year colleges.  
A second interpretation is that dropping new entrants may bias the results by making the 
post-Promise ineligible group less comparable to the pre-Promise ineligibles. Dropping new 
entrants seems to have its effect largely by reducing the ineligibles in 2008 to a much smaller 
group, who are more likely to go to a four-year college.23 Because of excluding late entrants, the 
class of 2008 cannot include any student who entered KPS in eleventh or twelfth grade, yet 
students who entered in these grades are still included among the pre-Promise ineligibles. If pre-
Promise and post-Promise ineligibles are less comparable, then the ineligible dummy cannot 
control for fixed unobservables.  
A third interpretation is that the effects of the Promise on four-year college attendance 
might be increasing over time. The estimates without new entrants necessarily exclude 
22 The p-values for tests of equality between the paired sets of estimates are: 0.33 for the non-IPW six-
month any enrollment, 0.40 for the IPW six-month any enrollment, 0.33 for the non-IPW six-year any credential, 
0.55 for the IPW six-year any credential, 0.59 for the non-IPW six-year BA/BS, and 0.99 for the IPW six-year 
BA/BS. Relative to estimates that include the late-entrant students, the point estimates increase slightly for the six-
month any enrollment, decrease slightly for the six-year any credential, and are almost the same for the six-year 
BA/BS. 
23 Dropping late entrants means that ineligibles for the class of 2007 must have entered KPS in tenth or 
eleventh grade and ineligibles in the class of 2008 must have entered KPS in tenth grade; ineligibles in later cohorts 
are excluded by construction. As a consequence, we lose 56 ineligible late-entrant students from the classes of 2008 
or earlier, and 34 of these come from the class of 2008. The count of ineligibles in the class of 2008 falls from 54 
(with four-year college enrollment of 0.185) to 20 students (with four-year college enrollment of 0.450).  
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 information from later cohorts, as these cohorts lack ineligible students in the estimation sample. 
Bartik and Lachowska (2013) find evidence that the Promise had increasing effects over time on 
improving student behavior, and on increasing African American students’ GPA. Estimates 
restricted to earlier cohorts might miss these increasing effects, and, because of the role of 
covariates, the individual-year estimates shown in Figures 4 through 6 might not fully capture 
them either.  
Overall, we think these robustness checks support the validity of our identification 
assumptions.  
HETEROGENEITY 
An important question is the extent to which the Promise effects vary across demographic 
groups. The simplicity of the Kalamazoo Promise means that the scholarship is not necessarily 
targeted at those who need it most (the financially constrained) or those who would be expected 
to benefit most (the academically capable). Although the aggregate estimates imply that the 
Promise does not simply reflect an income transfer to inframarginal students, it is entirely 
possible that the gains are concentrated among relatively more-advantaged groups, which could 
limit its potential (and that of other place-based scholarships) to promote social mobility.    
Table 7 reports selected results for how Promise effects vary with family income (proxied 
by free or reduced-price lunch status), race, and gender. For conciseness, we focus on Promise 
effects for three outcomes: four-year college attendance within six months, credits attempted at 
two years, and six-year attainment of a BA/BS. 
As shown in the first panel, the point estimates for Promise effects are both substantively 
and statistically similar for lower-income students and their higher-income peers. Notably, both 
24 
 groups experience sizable gains in enrollment and credits attempted, and the magnitudes for 
baccalaureate completion are considerable even if the estimates are imprecise. Although point 
estimates are slightly higher for students who were not eligible for free or reduced-price lunches, 
the differences are small and not statistically significant. Moreover, because the baseline 
postsecondary outcomes are much lower for the low-income groups, the effect of the Promise in 
proportional terms is much higher for these students. In particular, their attendance at four-year 
colleges increases by more than 50 percent (about twice the percentage increase for higher-
income students), credits attempted within two years jumps 23 percent (17 percent for higher-
income students), and bachelor’s completion within six years rises (imprecisely) by 57 percent 
(22 percent for higher-income students). These results suggest that the Promise does not benefit 
only students from relatively well-to-do families but reaches broadly across the economic 
spectrum. 
 The second panel shows differential results for white students and minority students (who 
are overwhelmingly black or Hispanic; see Table 2A). The estimates on four-year college 
enrollment are nearly identical across the racial groups, at 10 percentage points, but only the 
effect for nonwhite students is statistically significant, and because of the lower baseline for 
these students, the effect is twice as large in proportional terms relative to white students. For 
credits attempted, the effect for white students is a relatively imprecise zero, but for nonwhite 
students it is a statistically significant 6.2 credits, or about two classes; remarkably, this 
represents a 34 percent increase from baseline. For baccalaureate completion, neither estimate 
approaches statistical significance, owing to the reduced sample size, but the point estimate for 
nonwhite students is roughly three times as large as it is for white students, and, proportionally, 
approaches an effect size of 50 percent. In accord with the first panel, the Promise boosts 
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 postsecondary outcomes among racial minorities (who typically are economically 
disadvantaged) at least as much as it does for white students. 
 Comparing males and females in the third panel, it is clear that Promise effects are 
considerably larger for women than for men. Unlike the previous two panels, baseline means 
vary relatively little across sexes, but the point estimates are consistently large and statistically 
significant for women and small or close to zero and statistically insignificant for men. (Because 
of the reduced sample sizes, these differences are seldom statistically different, however.)  The 
gap between men and women is particularly stark for baccalaureate completion: the Promise 
boosts women’s attainment by 13.3 percentage points (45 percent), while men seem to 
experience zero benefit. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper’s estimates suggest that the Kalamazoo Promise has large effects on 
postsecondary outcomes. This conclusion seems reasonable in part because the estimates are 
consistent: they show sizable percentage effects on postsecondary attendance, credits, and 
attainment. The estimates also have reasonable patterns across outcomes: for example, the 
substitution of Promise-eligible colleges for ineligible colleges makes sense, as does the 
substitution of four-year colleges for two-year colleges. These findings echo the patterns in the 
earlier analysis of ACT score-sending of Andrews, DesJardins, and Ranchhod (2010).  
 The pattern of Promise effects across students is also quite similar to  Angrist et al. 
(2015), who study the effect of college scholarships—covering full tuition and fees—that were 
conditionally randomly assigned to academically talented high school seniors in Nebraska. They 
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 find the strongest effects on enrollment and second-year persistence for disadvantaged groups, 
such as racial minorities. 
 We emphasize that the identification strategy we have used in this paper provides a 
conservative estimate of Promise effects. Our strategy, by its design, cannot capture Promise 
effects that are school-wide or community-wide. For example, the Promise has led to intensive 
effects, by both KPS school officials and many in the Kalamazoo community, to encourage a 
more “college-going culture” among students and their parents and guardians. Billboards, 
mailings, class meetings, and school-wide and community-wide meetings inform parents and 
students of college’s nature and benefits and the application process. Counseling, tutoring, and 
support services encouraging students to stay in school and succeed have been initiated. More 
Advanced Placement courses have been offered. All of these KPS and community efforts, which 
are more or less tied to the Promise as a unifying theme, may affect the college enrollment and 
success of all KPS students, both Promise-eligible and -ineligible. Peer effects from Promise-
eligible students might also affect Promise-ineligible students. Our comparison of different time 
trends for Promise-eligible versus -ineligible students cannot capture these district-wide and 
community-wide effects. What we can capture are the specific effects of being eligible for the 
Promise’s tuition subsidies, rather than the many broader Promise effects on school and 
community climate.  
Nonetheless, and despite these limitations, the Promise effects are large, and they speak 
to the potential of place-based scholarship programs to be a cost-effective way of increasing 
earnings. A back-of-the-envelope calculation drawing on our degree completion estimates 
(detailed in Appendix B) shows that the present value of increased career earnings exceeds the 
costs of Promise tuition subsidies at all real discount rates of up to 11.3 percent. At a real 
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 discount rate of 3 percent (5 percent), the implied Promise earnings effects have a present value 
that is 4.7 (3.0) times the present value of Promise subsidy costs. Since we believe the external 
validity of our results to be high, this conclusion could likely apply to other urban school districts 
considering setting up their own Promise-like scholarships—at least to the extent that they 
closely follow the Kalamazoo model in terms of universality and generosity. 
On the other hand, the Promise effects have the potential for solving only a portion of 
America’s skills challenge. The Promise increases postsecondary credential attainment at six 
years after high school graduation from 36 percent to 48 percent. Presumably some of the 
remaining 52 percent might benefit from receipt of a postsecondary educational credential. As 
one might expect, “free” college is insufficient by itself to ensure higher skill levels through 
postsecondary education. Other policies prior to age 18 are likely needed to improve outcomes 
for more students. However, simple and generous scholarship programs have the potential of 
being a cost-effective component of the policy toolbox to increase the educational attainment of 
American students.  
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 Figure 1  KPS Enrollment, 1987–2013 
 
NOTE: Enrollment is as of the official fall count day. 
SOURCE:  Michigan Center for Educational Performance and Information (CEPI). 
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 Figure 2  Application Form for the Kalamazoo Promise  
 
SOURCE: The Kalamazoo Promise. 
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 Figure 3  Generosity of the Kalamazoo Promise Scholarship, by Grade of Initial Enrollment 
 
SOURCE: Eligibility rules from the Kalamazoo Promise. 
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 Figure 4  Fitted Probabilities of Four-Year College Attendance, by Year and Promise Eligibility 
 
NOTE: The plotted values represent fitted probabilities of attending a four-year college within six months of high school 
graduation, by class year and Promise eligibility, taken from the underlying specification in column 1 of Table 3 but allowing the 
Promise effects to vary by year. The plots control for demographic characteristics; see the notes to Table 3. Point-wise 95-percent 
confidence intervals shown. 
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 Figure 5  Predicted Number of Credits Attempted, by Year and Promise Eligibility 
 
NOTE: The plotted values represent predicted number of credits attempted within two years of high school graduation, by class 
year and Promise eligibility, taken from the underlying specification in column 1 of Table 5 but allowing the Promise effects to 
vary by year. The plots control for demographic characteristics; see the notes to Table 5. Point-wise 95-percent confidence 
intervals shown. 
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 Figure 6  Fitted Probabilities of BA/BS Attainment, by Year and Promise Eligibility 
 
NOTE: The plotted values represent fitted probabilities of attaining a bachelor’s degree within six years of high school 
graduation, by class year and Promise eligibility, taken from the underlying specification in column 1 of Table 6 but allowing the 
Promise effects to vary by year. The plots control for demographic characteristics; see the notes to Table 6. Point-wise 95-percent 
confidence intervals shown. 
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 Table 1  High School Graduates in KPS and Promise (Pseudo-)Eligibility 
Year Graduates Eligible Ineligible 
2003 525 0 (452) 525 (73) 
2004 551 0 (457) 551 (94) 
2005 392 0 (349) 392 (43) 
2006 (1st Promise cohort) 449 388 61 
2007 504 462 42 
2008 484 430 54 
2009 466 420 46 
2010 498 452 46 
2011 507 459 48 
2012 526 477 49 
2013 513 483 30 
    
Total 5,415 4,829 586 
NOTE: Numbers represent authors’ calculations of the number of graduates receiving high school 
diplomas (excluding alternative education programs) from Kalamazoo Public Schools and eligibility for 
the Promise. From 2006 onward, eligibility is taken from administrative records from the Kalamazoo 
Promise. Before 2006, no cohorts were eligible; the numbers in parentheses represent the number of 
graduates who would have been eligible had the Promise been in effect for those cohorts. See text for 
eligibility assignment rules. The lower graduate count in 2005 is in large part due to the alternative high 
school being closed that year. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from KPS and Kalamazoo Promise administrative data. 
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 Table 2A  Descriptive Statistics of Sample 
Variable All Eligibles Ineligibles Before  After 
Demographics      
  Male 0.471 0.475 0.442 0.465 0.473 
  Black 0.411 0.399 0.507 0.367 0.427 
  Asian 0.026 0.024 0.046 0.023 0.027 
  Hispanic 0.070 0.069 0.078 0.055 0.076 
  White 0.485 0.500 0.358 0.550 0.460 
  Subsidized lunch 0.505 0.494 0.597 0.364 0.558 
  High school 1 0.513 0.515 0.497 0.475 0.527 
  High school 2 0.403 0.408 0.360 0.435 0.391 
      
N 5,415 4,829 586 1,468 3,947 
NOTE: Numbers represent authors’ calculations of demographic characteristics of KPS graduates for the 
classes of 2003 through 2013 (excluding alternative education programs). From 2006 onward, eligibility 
is taken from administrative records from the Kalamazoo Promise. Before 2006, eligibility is assigned 
based on Promise rules had the Promise been in effect for those cohorts. “Before” represents the cohorts 
2003 through 2005; “After” represents the cohorts 2006 through 2013. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from KPS and Kalamazoo Promise administrative data. 
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 Table 2B  Descriptive Statistics, Reweighted Sample 
  No reweighting  Reweighting 
Variable Before After Diff p-val  Before After Diff p-val 
Demographics       
 
     
  Male 0.465 0.473 0.008 0.60 0.465 0.467 0.002 0.90 
  Black 0.367 0.427 0.060 0.00  0.367 0.369 0.002 0.88 
  Asian 0.023 0.027 0.004 0.40  0.023 0.021 −0.003 0.60 
  Hispanic 0.055 0.076 0.020 0.01  0.055 0.054 −0.001 0.89 
  White 0.550 0.460 −0.089 0.00  0.550 0.551 0.001 0.93 
  Subsid. lunch 0.370 0.558 0.188 0.00  0.370 0.371 0.001 0.95 
  High school 1 0.476 0.527 0.051 0.00  0.476 0.478 0.001 0.93 
  High school 2 0.435 0.391 −0.044 0.00  0.435 0.437 0.002 0.89 
          
N 1,468 3,947    1,468 3,947   
NOTE: See Table 2A. See text for details of reweighting procedure. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from KPS and Kalamazoo Promise administrative data. 
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 Table 3  Promise Effects on Enrollment  
 (1) (2) 
Panel A:  Enrollment within 6 months   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.602   
After × Eligible 0.084** 0.085* 
 (0.042) (0.047) 
R2 0.142 0.172 
Panel B:   Enrollment within 12 months   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.662   
After × Eligible 0.053 0.054 
 (0.042) (0.046) 
R2 0.150 0.184 
Panel C:  Enrollment at 4-yr. within 6 months   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.397   
After × Eligible 0.099** 0.133*** 
 (0.039) (0.041) 
R2 0.183 0.189 
Panel D:  Enrollment at 4-yr. within 12 months   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.405   
After × Eligible 0.095** 0.129*** 
 (0.040) (0.043) 
R2 0.186 0.193 
Use IPW? N Y 
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 
0.01, 0.05, or 0.10. Outcome timing is since high school graduation. Regressions include dummies 
for after the Promise, individual (pseudo-)eligibility, and graduation year. Other controls are sex, 
race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price lunch status, and high school of graduation. The mean of the 
dependent variable is for eligible population in the pre-Promise period. Sample size is 5,415 with 
demographic controls, 5,377 with IPW reweighting; the smaller IPW sample reflects lack of matches 
in the fully saturated propensity score model. 
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 Table 4  Promise Effects on Enrollment by Type of School (Promise vs. non-Promise school) 
 (1)  (2) 
Panel A:   Enroll at a Promise school within 6 months  
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.472   
After × Eligible 0.184*** 0.178*** 
 (0.043) (0.047) 
R2 0.133 0.150 
Panel B:  Enroll at a 4-yr. Promise school within 6 months  
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.277   
After × Eligible 0.175*** 0.207*** 
 (0.036) (0.038) 
R2 0.159 0.167 
Panel C:  Enroll at a 4-yr. non-Promise school within 6 months  
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.130   
After × Eligible −0.099*** −0.093*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) 
R2 0.039 0.039 
Use IPW? N Y 
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 
0.05, or 0.10. Outcome timing is since high school graduation. Regressions include dummies for after the 
Promise, individual (pseudo-)eligibility, and graduation year. Other controls are sex, race/ethnicity, 
free/reduced-price lunch status, and high school of graduation. The mean of the dependent variable is for 
eligible population in the pre-Promise period. Sample sizes are the same as in Table 3 (5,415 with 
demographic controls, 5,377 with IPW reweighting, with the smaller IPW sample reflecting lack of 
matches). The sample is the total of students. The dependent variable in Table 4, Panel A is equal to 1 if a 
student enrolls at any Promise-eligible school and 0 otherwise. Analogous definitions hold for panels B and 
C. 
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 Table 5  Promise Effects on Credits Attempted  
   (1)  (2) 
Panel A:  Credits attempted at 2 years   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 24.66   
After × Eligible 3.17* 3.59* 
 (1.67) (1.83) 
R2 0.200 0.211 
N 4,902 4,870 
Panel B:  Credits attempted at 3 years   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 35.59   
After × Eligible 4.56* 5.68** 
 (2.51) (2.69) 
R2 0.213 0.222 
N 4,376 4,352 
Panel C:  Credits attempted at 4 years   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 45.93   
After × Eligible 6.87** 9.27** 
 (3.41) (3.58) 
R2 0.208 0.214 
N 3,869 3,851 
Use IPW? N Y 
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p 
< 0.01, 0.05, or 0.10. Outcome timing is since high school graduation. Regressions include 
dummies for after the Promise, individual (pseudo-)eligibility, and graduation year. Other 
controls are sex, race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price lunch status, and high school of graduation. 
The mean of the dependent variable is for eligible population in the pre-Promise period. Smaller 
IPW sample reflects lack of matches in the fully saturated propensity score model. 
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 Table 6  Promise Effects on Degree Attainment 
 (1) (2) 
Panel A:  Any credential at 4 years   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.184   
After × Eligible 0.004 0.019 
 (0.032) (0.035) 
R2 0.085 0.075 
Panel B:  Any credential at 6 years   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.357   
After × Eligible 0.091* 0.123** 
 (0.047) (0.050) 
R2 0.145 0.132 
Panel C:  BA/BS at 4 years   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.141   
After × Eligible 0.004 0.016 
 (0.024) (0.028) 
R2 0.113 0.098 
Panel D:  BA/BS at 6 years   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.= 1) = 0.296   
After × Eligible 0.067* 0.097** 
 (0.041) (0.045) 
R2 0.178 0.159 
Use IPW? N Y 
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p 
< 0.01, 0.05, or 0.10. Outcome timing is since high school graduation. Regressions include 
dummies for after the Promise, individual (pseudo-)eligibility, and graduation year. Other 
controls are sex, race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price lunch status, and high school of graduation. 
The mean of the dependent variable is for eligible population in the pre-Promise period. Sample 
sizes are 3,869 (3,851) at four years for non-IPW (IPW) sample, and 2,905 (2,896) at six years 
for non-IPW (IPW) sample. Smaller IPW sample reflects lack of matches in the fully saturated 
propensity score model. 
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 Table 7  Promise Effects by Group 
 6-month attendance 
at 4-year 2-year credits attempted 
6-year BA/BS 
attainment 
Income 
groups 
Non-low 
income 
Low-
income 
Non-low 
income 
Low-
income 
Non-low 
income 
Low-
income 
After × Elig  0.137** 0.108** 4.92* 3.62* 0.089 0.059 
 (0.066) (0.048) (2.68) (2.19) (0.076) (0.043) 
N 2,666 2,744 2,457 2,440 1,641 1,259 
p-val of 
group diff 0.718 
 0.705  0.723 
Mean DV 0.506 0.191 29.45 15.70 0.398 0.104 
Race White Non-
white 
White Non-
white 
White Non-
white 
After × Elig  0.103 0.104** −0.67 6.21** 0.026 0.073 
 (0.067) (0.048) (2.77) (2.12) (0.069) (0.048) 
N 2,624 2,791 2,410 2,492 1,545 1,360 
p-val of 
group diff 
 0.990  0.048  0.570 
Mean DV 0.505 0.250 29.45 18.13 0.397 0.158 
Gender Male Female Male Female Male Female 
After × Elig  0.084 0.121** 1.31 5.08** −0.003 0.133** 
 (0.058) (0.053) (2.35) (2.34) (0.055) (0.059) 
N 2,551 2,864 2,293 2,609 1,388 1,517 
p-val of 
group diff  0.637  0.254  0.088 
Mean DV 0.396 0.398 25.38 24.02 0.294 0.297 
NOTE: All estimates calculated without IPW weights; results using IPW are similar and available on request. 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. *** , **, and * indicates p less than 0.01, 
0.05, or 0.10. Timing is since high school graduation. All regressions include dummies for after the 
Promise’s introduction, individual (pseudo-) eligibility, and graduation year. Other controls are sex, 
race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price lunch status, and high school of graduation (except when subgroup is 
restricted on one of these dimensions). The income groupings pertain to whether the student is eligible for 
free/reduced price lunch or not. The race groups are white non-Hispanic versus other groups. The mean of the 
dependent variable for each group is calculated over the eligible population in the pre-Promise period. 
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 Appendix A 
 
Data 
 
 
This appendix gives more information on our data, estimation sample, and variables.   
1.  DESCRIPTION OF KPS ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS AND VARIABLE 
DEFINITIONS  
Our main data is derived from administrative records of KPS students from the graduating 
classes of 2003 through 2013. From these data, we define graduates based on entry and exit 
codes provided by KPS. 
 From the KPS records, we obtain information about high school of graduation and 
student demographics, including sex, race/ethnicity (Native American, Black, Asian, Hispanic, 
or White), and participation in the federal assisted lunch program (a binary yes/no variable). We 
also obtain data for high school of graduation and academic variables (cumulative GPA, highest 
math class taken, the number of AP classes taken, and whether the student attended the 
Kalamazoo Area Mathematics and Science Center [KAMSC]). Except for lunch status, we 
observe each of these variables for every high school graduate. We do not observe lunch status 
for the class of 2003; instead, we impute this variable as described in section 1.2, below.24 
1.1 Definition of Kalamazoo Promise Eligibility  
We use the KPS student entry and withdrawal records to construct our key explanatory 
variable, the indicator for whether a high school graduate is eligible for the Kalamazoo Promise. 
The KPS school tenure records go back to the 1996–1997 school year, which allows us to track 
24 As they are endogenous (Bartik and Lachowska 2013), the academic variables are used only for this 
lunch status imputation and not in the main analysis. 
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 continuous enrollment histories for most students, although earlier cohorts have truncated 
histories. For example, for the high school class of 2003, we observe records back to sixth grade 
(if the student was on time), but not earlier.  
For the graduates from the classes of 2003 through 2005—the pre-Promise period—we 
define an eligibility variable that equals one if the student is eligible for any tuition subsidy (65 
percent or more) had the Kalamazoo Promise been in effect at that time, and zero if the student is 
not eligible for any subsidies. We define a student as eligible if he or she had been continuously 
enrolled in KPS from before the fall count date in ninth grade. If the student enrolled after the 
ninth-grade fall count date, we count that student as ineligible in accord with Promise rules. In 
the post-Promise period (2006–2013), we use administrative records directly from the 
Kalamazoo Promise. We made this decision in part because the student entry and withdrawal 
records available to us end in 2010–2011, which means we lack full records for 2012 and 2013 
graduates on continuous enrollment. Comparing our calculated Promise eligibility to actual 
Promise eligibility in the overlapping period shows a close match (Appendix Table A1).  
Appendix Table A1: Eligibility Comparison between Administrative Data and Assignment Algorithm 
Class 
year 
Eligible by administrative 
data  
Eligible by algorithm Exact match 
2006 388 388 376 
2007 462 455 449 
2008 430 426 420 
2009 420 413 408 
2010 452 451 445 
2011 459 463 449 
1.2 Free or Reduced Lunch Program Participation in 2003 
Because the KPS data do not record whether students participated in the federal assisted 
lunch program in 2003, we impute this variable using data from the other two pre-Promise years, 
2004 and 2005. Using data for these two years, we predict the probability that a student is on the 
federal assisted lunch program by logistic regression of the lunch status dummy on a fully 
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 saturated (i.e., all possible interactions) vector of controls: gender, race/ethnicity, high school 
indicator, and a KAMSC dummy. The regression also includes achievement variables: 
cumulative school-year-level GPA as a cubic spline, cumulative AP classes taken, and dummies 
for the highest math class taken.  
We define a student as participating in the lunch program using the following two-step 
procedure. First, using a random-number generator, we create a variable that is uniformly 
distributed from 0 to 1. Second, we assign a student to the lunch program if the predicted value 
of a student’s lunch-program participation probability exceeds his or her corresponding random-
number value.  
2.  DESCRIPTION OF NSC DATA  
The National Student Clearinghouse (NSC) is a nonprofit organization that tracks student 
enrollment at nearly all postsecondary institutions at which students can receive federal financial 
aid. Through the StudentTracker service, school districts can submit student names and birth 
dates, and NSC will match with their database and return postsecondary enrollment records. We 
obtained StudentTracker data from KPS covering the high school graduating classes of 2003 
through 2013 and the enrollment periods of Fall 2003 through Spring 2014. 
 The data provide the college attended for each term’s enrollment. They also record the 
intensity of enrollment (full-time, half-time, less than half-time, and whether the student 
withdrew). We also observe whether a credential was received, the type of credential, and the 
date of receipt. Together these data are used to construct our outcome variables.  
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  We are able to match more than 97 percent of the KPS graduates in our data to NSC 
records (Appendix Table A2).25 Of the unmatched, nearly half are from 2003: for this year, NSC 
reports no graduates from KPS’s alternative high school. Our estimates control for high school of 
graduation, so this exclusion is not problematic.  
Appendix Table A2: Final Match Rates 
Class year Final Matched Estimation Sample All KPS grads 
2003 525 585 
2004 551 552 
2005 392 393 
2006 449 457 
2007 504 522 
2008 484 501 
2009 466 467 
2010 498 500 
2011 507 522 
2012 526 531 
2013 513 519 
Total 5,415 5,549 
NOTE: All KPS grads refer to graduates earning a regular high school diploma. 
Although the match rate is high, the NSC has shortcomings. As detailed by Dynarski, 
Hemelt, and Hyman (2013), NSC data do not cover all colleges, and some records are blocked 
because of student or school requests under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA). They show that coverage ranged from about 83 percent of students in 2003 to 90 
percent in 2011. For Michigan colleges, coverage was slightly lower than for the nation in 2003 
and slightly larger in 2011. For-profit institutions have lower coverage than other institution 
types.  
 The most relevant coverage issue for this paper is for Kalamazoo Valley Community 
College (KVCC), the local public two-year school, which approximately one-third of KPS 
graduates attend. KVCC does not provide student records to NSC before 2005. As a substitute, 
we obtained equivalent data for KPS graduates for the Summer 2003 through Summer 2005 
25 Discrepancies between the two columns are primarily, but not exclusively, due to failed NSC matches. A 
very few additional graduates lacked core data, such as graduation date.  
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 period directly from KVCC upon special request, in cooperation with KPS and the Kalamazoo 
Promise. There are other schools for which NSC coverage began during our sample period, but 
none are (or were) attended in large numbers by KPS graduates.26  
2.1 Construction of Outcome Variables 
The NSC data contain the dates enrollment begins and ends for each college attended. 
We combine these data with dates of high school graduation to determine whether and what type 
of postsecondary institution was attended within different time frames of high school graduation. 
We do not count college enrollment that began before high school graduation (i.e., dual 
enrollment).  
 The NSC data do not contain the number of credits attempted or earned, but they do 
contain a measure of enrollment intensity: full-time, half-time, less than half-time, or withdrawn. 
For institutions on a semester system, we assign 12 credits, 6 credits, 3 credits, and 0 credits 
attempted to each of the categories, respectively. For institutions on a trimester or quarter 
system, we assign credits per term that are proportionally adjusted to accord with the semester 
system over a standard academic year. We determine timing based on enrollment end dates and 
high school graduation dates, as above. The credit assignments are approximations, but as long 
as actual credits attempted to do not differentially vary by eligibility over time, our estimates 
should not be biased. The NSC data also provide the type and date of degrees or credentials 
earned, separately from enrollment. 
 
  
26 Within Michigan, coverage for Wayne State University (four-year public) and Washtenaw Community 
College (two-year public) began in 2004, Michigan Tech University (four-year public) began in 2008, Baker 
College of Flint and Davenport University (both four-year private nonprofit) began in 2009, and Everest Institute of 
Kalamazoo (four-year for-profit) began in 2011. Outside of Michigan, coverage for the University of Phoenix began 
in 2006. 
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 Appendix B 
 
Benefits and Costs of the Promise 
 
 
In order to conduct a partial cost and benefit analysis, we need to translate our estimates 
of Promise effects on postsecondary outcomes into dollars. To do so, we predict the effects of 
educational credentials on future earnings.  
This benefit calculation is partial in that it accounts only for the earnings benefits of 
individual students’ Promise eligibility. This may understate total returns by not capturing the 
nonpecuniary returns to individuals (Oreopoulos and Salvanes 2011) or community-wide gains; 
for example, we do not account for the economic benefits of attracting parents and businesses to 
the community. 
We compare these earnings benefits with the tuition subsidy costs of the Promise to the 
donors. A more complete cost analysis would also account for the transfer value of the Promise 
to students and their families and any psychic or private costs of increased college attendance.  
Overall, our analysis probably understates benefits relative to costs. But these estimates 
may interest communities exploring their own Promise programs.  
1.  CALCULATING THE PRESENT VALUE OF A COLLEGE DEGREE 
In order to compute the present value of a college degree, we simulate future earnings of 
KPS students. To do so, we use microdata from the 2012 American Community Survey (ACS) 
and apply the following procedure:  
• First, using the 2012 ACS, we compute average unconditional earnings by age level from 25 
to 79 (we start with age 25 to allow completion of educational attainment) and by three 
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 educational attainment categories: 1) high school graduates with a high school diploma but 
without any postsecondary credential, 2) people with an associate’s degree, and 3) people 
with at least a bachelor’s degree.  
• Second, we adjust for future earnings increases (i.e., since 2012) by assuming that future 
real wage growth is equal to 1.2 percent, in accordance with the assumptions of the trustees 
of the Social Security Administration (Office of the Chief Actuary 2012). At each age level, 
we adjust future earnings by the unisex probability of survival, conditional on being alive at 
18 years of age.  
• Third, we discount the mortality-adjusted future earnings back to age 18. The baseline real 
discount rate is 3 percent. We compute two net present values: 1) the net present value of an 
associate’s degree relative to a high-school diploma (we call this net PVAA) and 2) the net 
present value of at least a bachelor’s degree relative to a high-school diploma (we call this 
net PVBA). We also consider 5 percent as a real discount rate, and we consider the “rate of 
return” to the Promise’s investment, which is the real discount rate that equates these future 
Promise earnings benefits to the Promise’s tuition subsidy costs.  
• Fourth, we use our preferred estimate of the causal effect of the Promise on two outcomes: 
1) obtaining an associate’s degree (a 1.6-percentage-point increase)27; and 2) obtaining a 
BA/BS degree (a 9.7-percentage-point increase; see Table 6, Panel D), and then we multiply 
net PVAA and net PVBA each by the relevant point estimate.  
27 Derived from Table 6, Panel B and Panel D, which estimate Promise effects on any credential and on a 
bachelor’s degree, respectively. The difference is the Promise effect on earning a non-bachelor’s credential. We 
multiply this difference by the observed share of our nonbaccalureate-degree-earning sample with an associate’s 
degree. This product yields an estimate that the Promise increases associate degrees by 1.6 percentage points.  
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 2.  CALCULATING THE PRESENT VALUE OF TUITION SUBSIDY COSTS 
We calculate the present value of the Promise tuition costs using available actual cost 
data from the Kalamazoo Promise for every eligible student in our analysis sample. The cost data 
are deflated to 2012-constant prices using the PCE deflator from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, and we have assumed that tuition payments are made three times a year (in June, 
September, and January). All of the cost data are discounted back to the June of a KPS student’s 
senior high-school year.  
The effects of the Promise on obtaining any college degree are estimated using the first 
three cohorts (cohorts that graduated in 2006, 2007, and 2008). Because of data limitations, our 
cost data are complete only for the 2006 and 2007 cohorts. We calculate present values of costs 
on a per-eligible student basis and see no significant changes between the 2006 and 2007 
cohorts, and we would expect no large differences in per-student figures for the 2008 cohort.  
3.  A PARTIAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Our partial cost-benefit analysis suggests that, when using a real discount rate of 3 
percent, the ratio of benefits to costs is about 4.7. Using a 5 percent discount rate, we obtain that 
the ratio of benefits to costs is about 3.0. It is also interesting to calculate the Promise’s internal 
rate of return—that is, the real discount rate at which benefits equal costs. Our calculations show 
that this rate equals 11.3 percent, which by any standard is a high real rate of return. 
 The estimates suggest that the Kalamazoo Promise has economic benefits that exceed 
program costs. A more complete analysis of the economic benefits of the Promise would most 
likely make this conclusion even stronger.  
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